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abstRaCt
in	this	study	i	critically	review	models	that	specify	competitive	reaction	effects.	i	discuss	
different	model	structures	and	summarize	my	findings	on	competitive	reaction	effects	
and	factors	that	explain	competitive	reactions.	 i	discuss	the	many	models	of	competi-
tive	market	 response	 that	have	been	developed	and	classify	 them	 into	 twelve	 sets	of	
models	 that	 are	 related	 to	 each	 other	 in	 a	 logical	 manner	 through	 the	 evolutionary	
model-building	concept.
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1 evolutionaRy Model building
In this study I review models that specify competitive reaction effects. Many of the models 
that have been developed in the past 40 years are connected to models that were developed 
earlier. Here, I make the connections between different groups of models by using the evolu-
tionary model-building concept. The basic idea of evolutionary model building is that the 
model builder begins with a relative simple model. Simplicity is paramount so that managers 
understand these models. Early applications may reveal shortcomings, and diagnostics can be 
used to guide further model development. The builder then expands the model, which will 
lead increasing the complexity of the model (Little (1970); Urban and Karash (1971)).
The evolutionary model-building concept primarily has been applied in the context of 
marketing decision models. By gradually adding more complexities to simpler models, both 
model builders and model users jointly develop a more complete model by incorpo-
rating additional elements. The manager (model user) still understands this more complex 
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model, because usually it is her realization that something that was missing led to the 
increase in complexity.
As an implementation strategy, evolutionary model building increases the likelihood of 
model acceptance for several reasons1. First, evolutionary model building implies contin-
uous user involvement, which should lead to reduced resistance to change. Second, it leads 
to a communication pattern that is more favorable to model acceptance. Finally, the end 
product makes an optimal match between the environmental complexity of the model 
and the integrative complexity of the user.
Evolutionary model building can also be observed in the sequence of models and model-
building methods that are developed to discover and exploit a particular area in marketing 
science. Models evolve for many reasons. For example, they can be used to identify oppor-
tunities to improve an earlier specification; to identify opportunities to apply existing 
approaches to new problems; to combine different research areas to a new one; to create 
access to better data; and to make available new methods (specification, estimation and 
testing, etc.).
In marketing science, the evolutionary model-building steps are performed by several 
groups, or even generations, of model builders. In an earlier paper, Van Heerde et al. (2002) 
illustrated the process for models that measure the effectiveness of sales promotions. In this 
paper I illustrate this process in the context of the models of competitive response. I also 
give a brief survey of some of the models that have been developed in this area, without 
having the intention of being complete. In modern marketing, much attention is devoted 
to competition. The intensity of competition may increase in times when markets show 
minimal growth. In this study I demonstrate which models can be used to this end. I 
conclude that there are different niches for different model types, and that these different 
model types are connected. I use the evolutionary model-building approach to connect the 
different competitive response models. I begin by discussing the rationale for using compet-
itive response models. In Section 3, I examine the specification and estimation of compet-
itive response models. In doing so, I follow the evolutionary model-building approach. In 
Section 4, I discuss main findings of research on competition. In Section 5, I consider how 
companies can use this knowledge to devise their strategies vis-à-vis competition. 
2 a Rationale to aCCount foR CoMpetitive ReaCtions
Recent research findings (Montgomery et al. (2005)) demonstrate that although managers 
consider competitors in their decision making, their considerations focus primarily on 
competitors’ past or current behavior rather than on projecting competitors’ future reac-
tions. The low incidence of strategic competitor reasoning is due to perceptions of low 
returns from anticipating competitor reactions more than to the high cost of doing so. 
Hence, researchers need to convince managers that models and methods can be fruitfully 
applied to predict competitive reactions and to define firms’ future actions.
1 See Leeflang et al. (2000). 
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Here, I demonstrate how marketing decisions and marketing’s contribution to profit are 
affected if we account for competitive reactions. Thus, I specify the following model:
ˆq = βˆ0 + βˆa 
 
 √
__
 a + βˆac    √
__
 ac  (1)
C = cˆq + FC (2)
ˆπ = pˆq – C. (3)
In Equations (1)-(3), ˆq is the estimated demand of a brand (say brand j) in units, a, ac is 
the advertising expenditures of brand j and the advertising expenditures of a competitor 
respectively, C is the total cost, c is the variable cost per unit, FC is the fixed cost, and 
π is the profit. I do not use indexes j (brand) and t (time) just for the sake of restricting 
the number of indices. I assume that the model builder estimates parameters βˆa and βˆac 
by using time series data. βˆac represents the effects of competitive actions. Throughout, I 
assume that βˆa > 0, βˆac < 0 and p > c. The reduced form of Equations (1)-(3) is:
ˆπ = (p – c)(βˆ0 + βˆa 
 
 √
__
 a + βˆac   √
__
 ac ) – a – FC. (4)
I obtain the optimal advertising budget by differentiating (4) with respect to a and 
equating this expression to zero. First, I assume that there is no relation between a and 
ac. Hence, I get2:
aopt =  
{(p – c)βˆa} 2
 ________
4
 . (5)
The higher the margin, (p ‒ c), and the effectiveness of advertising, βˆa, the higher the 
optimal advertising budget will be.
I now assume that the competitor reacts with ac on a:
ˆac = ˆα0 + ˆˆα1a (6)
where I assume that ˆa1 > 0.
The effect of a change in a on q is now represented by:
 
∂q
 __
∂a
=  
∂qj
 __
∂a
+  
∂qj
 ___
∂ac
·  
∂ac ___
∂a
 (7)
where  ∂qj __
∂a
is the direct effect of advertising on demand and   ∂q __
∂a
 is the total effect of adver-
tising on demand. Given Equations (1) and (6), I have
2 To make sure that this expression for aopt  corresponds to a maximum, I examine the second-order conditions. I 
find that, given the assumptions about, ˆβa, ˆβac and (p – c), I can expect the second-order condition to be neg-
ative, which leads to a maximum value of π.
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∂q
 __
∂a
=  1 _
2
 · βˆa · a–1/2 + ˆα1 ·  
1
 _
2
 βˆac · ac–1/2.  (8)
Given that ˆβac > 0, the effect of brand j’s advertising on brand j’s demand is lower than 
if there is no competitive reaction. This also means that the marginal revenue product of 
advertising p ·  ∂q __
∂a
 is lower, which has implications for the optimal advertising expendi-
tures and the optimal profit. The optimal advertising expenditures, and thus the optimal 
profit, are a function of  ˆβac, ˆα1 and ac:
aopt =  
{(p – c)βˆa}2 ac
  ______________  
{2   √
__
 ac – βˆac ˆα1(p – c)}2
 .  (9)
If managers do not account for competitive actions and instead determine their budget on 
Equation (5), they will spend too much on advertising. This statement is conditional on 
the assumption that the estimates are unbiased. Biases in parameter estimates also lead to 
non-optimal decisions. Hence, managers’ decision-making will benefit from anticipating 
competitors’ reactions and estimating the values of βˆac and ˆα1, and then forecasting ac. 
There are different opportunities to obtain these forecasts, ranging from naïve methods 
such as act = ac,t – 1 or act  = 1.05ac,t – 1 (competitive advertising increases with 5% over 
time) to methods that use competitive reaction functions. For a more in-depth review see, 
for example, Alsem and Leeflang (1994), and Alsem et al. (1989).
3 Modeling CoMpetitive Responsiveness: speCifiCation and estiMation
In this section I briefly sketch some opportunities for modeling competitive behavior. 
Many models and methods attempt to diagnose and predict competitive behavior. In 
Figure 1, I depict the modeling of competitive responsiveness functions as an evolutionary 
process. The figure shows the different steps involved and twelve sets of models. 
The first step consists of building relatively simple models3, which may subsequently be 
expanded to incorporate additional elements, thus becoming more complex. Day and 
Wensley (1988) dichotomize competitive response models into competitor-centered 
methods and customer-focused approaches. Competitor-centered assessments use direct 
management comparisons between the firm and a few target competitors. These models 
often include a determination of the relative strengths and weaknesses of each firm and the 
extent to which competitors quickly match marketing activities initiated by another firm.
Customer-focused assessments start with detailed analyses of customer benefits within end-
user segments. These models work backward from the customer to the company to iden-
tify the necessary actions that will improve performance. Customer-focused assessments 
become possible by calibrating demand models that include competitive marketing vari-
ables. Classical micro-economic theory (see 1 in Figure 1) considers the impact of compet-
itive actions on demand on the basis of cross-elasticities. However, more specific marketing 
3 Cf. Urban and Karash (1971); Van Heerde et al. (2002).
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models also include marketing-mix instruments other than price, and use brand sales as 
the demand measure. 
In addition, demand equations may be supplemented by competitive reaction functions 
(Telser (1962)). For example, Lambin, Naert, and Bultez (1975) calibrate competitive 
reaction functions (see 2 in Figure 1) using data about a low-priced consumer durable 
good in West Germany. Extensions to their classical “LNB model” include more advanced 
competitive reaction functions (3) and demand functions (4). Using a framework based on 
cross-tabulations, other researchers have also studied reaction functions and demand func-
tions simultaneously (5). Furthermore, VARX models (Vector AutoRegressive models with 
eXogenous variables) provide a way to estimate advanced demand and competitive reac-
tion functions simultaneously (6). 
Managers can use these models (1-6) to determine the optimal marketing mix for one 
brand, assuming particular reaction patterns by competitors. That is, they do not offer 
a simultaneous optimum for all brands in a product class. Game-theoretic approaches 
address this issue, although most early game-theoretic models were theoretical and had 
no empirical applications4 (see 7 in Figure 1 ). Since the early 1980s, there have been 
major advances in game theory, particularly in the area of dynamic games. As a result, the 
theory has become far more applicable to the modeling of real-world competitive strate-
gies. Even more recently, marketers have embraced the new empirical industrial organiza-
tion (NEIO)-based approach to infer the competitive behavior of firms5 in terms of both 
horizontal (8) or vertical (9) competition, or both. Horizontal competition occurs between 
brands or organizations (retailers) that compete to match the preferences of the customers; 
vertical competition exists within the same (distribution) channel between different part-
ners that have, at least in principle, different groups of customers. Therefore, vertical 
competition deals with the allocation of the total profits in the distribution channel that 
flows from manufacturers to wholesalers to retailers. In the structural models such as these, 
price levels in the market depend on demand and cost conditions, as well as the nature of 
interfirm interactions in the market. By estimating both demand and supply functions, this 
approach decomposes price levels into the unique effects of demand, cost, and competitive 
behavior. (I note that these models typically assume steady-state competitive behavior.) In 
models that study time-varying competition (10), the direct effects of demand and cost 
changes on prices and the indirect effects on competitive intensity all come into play6. One 
of the most advanced models used to study competitive response (11)7 considers both 
vertical and horizontal competition; is based on advanced demand and competitive reac-
tion functions, and is dynamic. Finally, new models of competitive response (12) should 
satisfy various criteria and deal with many different issues such as endogeneity (Shugan 
(2004); (2005)) and market evolution (Soberman and Gatignon (2005)).
4 Examples are Friedman (1958); Mills (1961); Shakun (1966); Baligh and Richartz (1967); Gupta and Krishnan 
(1967a; b); Krishnan and Gupta (1967).
5 See Kadiyali et al. (2001) for a review.
6 Examples are models developed by Ellison (1994) and Sudhir et al. (2005).
7 The model of Ailawadi et al. (2005) has these features.
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(2): Lambin et al. (1975).  
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Figure 1:  Evolutionary model building in competitive responsiveness
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3.1  ClassiCal DemanD moDels
Incorporating competitive marketing instruments into a demand model offers oppor-
tunities to determine the effects of competitive actions in a relatively simple way. As an 
example, I specify the following model:
ˆq = ˆa + βˆp p + βˆpc pc + βˆaa+ βˆac ac (10)
where ˆq is the estimated demand of a brand (say brand j) in units, a, ac is the adver-
tising expenditures of brand j and the advertising expenditures of a competitor and p, 
pc are the price of the brand j and the competitive price, respectively. βˆpc and βˆac repre-
sent the effects of competitive actions on ˆq. The effects of competitive actions on sales 
can be predicted by substituting the expected future values of pc and ac in the estimated 
relation8. This classical model does not account for how brand j may react to competi-
tive actions or how brand j’s competitor reacts in turn to brand j’s actions, nor does it 
address how these reactions ultimately modify consumer demand. One of the first studies 
to explicitly model these competitive reaction effects is Kotler (1965). Kotler’s model has 
been modified in the so-called LNB model. 
3.2  lnB moDels
I consider the following functions for Q, product class sales, and m, a brand’s market 
share:
Q = QT(p, a, k, pc, ac, kc, ev) and m = mj(p, a, k, pc, ac, kc) (11)
where QT , mj are the functional forms for Total Quantity and brand j’s market share, 
respectively; p, pc is the price of a brand (say, brand j) and an index of competitors’ prices, 
respectively; k, kc is a quality measure for brand (j) and an index of competitors’ quality 
measures, respectively; a, ac is the advertising expenditure of brand (j) and an index of 
competitors’ advertising expenditures, respectively; and ev is a vector of environmental 
variables. These functions also provide examples of equations that represent consumers’ 
reactions to competitive actions (pc, ac, kc). Brand j’s sales elasticity with respect to its 
advertising (ηq,a) equals the total product class elasticity (ηQ,a) plus the total market share 
elasticity with respect to brand j ‘s advertising (ηm,a):
ηq,a = ηQ,a + ηm,a. (12)
These elasticity measures capture the effect of one brand’s advertising on consumer 
demand, but to capture total actual impact, I must consider how competitors react to 
brand advertising changes and how this reaction modifies consumer demand. The compet-
itive reactions belong to the set of competitor-centered approaches. I distinguish direct 
8 See, for example, Alsem et al. (1989).
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and indirect partial effects of brand j’s advertising on product class sales and on brand 
j’s own market share. An indirect partial effect captures the following scenario: If brand j 
changes its advertising expenditure level (Δa), then competitors may react by similarly, 
adapting their spending level (Δac), and, as discussed in Section 2, ac in turn influences 
Q and/or m. According to this explanation, which is the usual assumption in oligopoly 
theory, competitors react with the same marketing instrument as that which caused their 
reactions. Thus, competitors react to a change in price for j by changing their prices, to 
a change in advertising by an advertising response, and so forth. This type of reaction 
reflects the simple competitive reactions case. A more realistic approach, consistent with 
the concept of the marketing mix, accommodates multiple competitive reactions such 
that a competitor may react to a price change not just by changing its price, but also by 
changing its advertising and other such marketing instruments.
With a general case of multiple competitive reactions, I can write δQ/δa and δm/δa as 
follows:
 
δQ
 __
δa
 =  
δQT ___
δa
 +  
δQT ___
δpc
   
δpc ____
δa
 +  
δQT ___
δac
   
δac ___
δa
 +  
δQT ___
δkc
   
δkc ___
δa
  (13)
and
 δm ___
δa
 =  
δmj
 ___
δa
 +  
δmj
 ___
δpc
   
δpc __
δa
 +  
δmj
 ____
δac
   
δac ____
δa
 +  
δmj
 ____
δkc
   
δkc ____
δa
 . (14)
In (13) and (14) δQT/δa, δmj/δa are the direct effects and δQ/δa, δm/δa are the total 
effects.
By multiplying both sides of equation (13) by a/Q, I obtain the product-class elasticity, 
ηQ,a:
ηQ,a = ηQT,a + (ρ p c , a)(η Q T ,  p c  ) + (ρ a c , a)(η Q T , a c ) + (ρ k c ,  a)(η Q T ,  k c ) (15)
where ηQT,a is the direct product-class sales elasticity with respect to brand j’s advertising; 
η Q T , u  c  is the product-class sales elasticity with respect to competitors’ marketing instrument 
uc (= pc, ac, or kc); and ρc,a is the reaction elasticity of competitors’ instrument 
uc (= pc, ac, or kc) with respect to brand j’s advertising expenditures.
Similarly, I can decompose ηm,a as follows:
ηm,a = ηmj,a + (ρ p c ,a)(ηmj, p c ) + (ρ a c ,a)(ηmj, a c ) + (ρ k c ,a)(ηmj, k c ). (16)
The LNB model can be fruitfully applied if a company is not particularly interested in 
the effects of individual competitors, but rather in the effects of the aggregate of other 
brands/firms; does not face vertical competition; and specifies its marketing mix inde-
pendently from retailers. Extended LNB models relax one or more of these conditions. 
Hence, the extended LNB models are the result of identifying opportunities to improve 
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an earlier specification. They constitute the next generation of models of competitive 
market response.
3.3  extenDeD lnB moDels with aDvanCeD Competitive ReaCtion FunCtions
The extended LNB models relax the assumptions that all brands are represented by an 
aggregate brand, and that marketing mix decisions are specified independently from 
retailers.
The LNB model assumes that the market comprises a leader that uses marketing instru-
ments p, a, and k, and a follower, defined as the aggregate of other firms in the market. 
For example, 
pc =  ∑ 
r=2
n
  
pr
 _____ 
(n – 1)
 , p = p1, ac =  ∑ 
r=2
n
 ar, a = a1, (17)
and so forth, where n = total number of brands and “1” indicates the leading brand.
In extended LNB models, modelers make no distinction between leaders and followers. 
Instead, they consider all brands separately in what amounts to a decomposition of 
competitive interactions. 
An example of an extended LNB model is Hanssens’s (1980) approach9:
xℓjt = h(xℓ’rt – xℓjt); ℓ, ℓ′ = 1, ..., L; j, r = 1, ..., n , j ≠ r; t = 1, ..., T (18)
where xℓjt is the value of the ℓ-th marketing instrument of brand j in period t.
Equation (18) allows for joint decision-making when j = r, which summarizes the possi-
bility that changes in one variable result in changes in one or more other variables for a 
given brand. These relations between different variables for the same brand are known as 
intrafirm activities.
In equation (18) the number of equations to be estimated is Ln, and the many predictor 
variables can make its estimation difficult. For example, each equation may have 
(Ln ‒ 1) predictors, even if I do not consider time lags. Hence, if I consider five 
(L = 5) marketing instruments of five brands (n = 5), I have 24 predictors. This 
implies that I need about (5 x 24) ≈ 120 observations to obtain reliable estimates. 
Given that the time horizon used for calibration should not be too long (say, two 
years), I must work with weekly data. The data that researchers use to calibrate the 
reaction functions in these studies generally involve manufacturers’ actions and reac-
tions. In the past, researchers used monthly, bimonthly, or quarterly data, but scanner 
data offers many new opportunities to study competitive reactions. However, cali-
brating competitive reaction functions with weekly scanner data collected at the 
9 In (18) the “substraction” of xℓjt means that instrument ℓ for brand j in period t is not a predictor variable.
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retail level involves its own problems, because changes in marketing activities may 
reflect the actions and reactions of both retailers and manufacturers. For example, 
ultimately, price decisions about a brand are made by the retailers (Kim and Staelin 
(1999)). Temporary price cuts, displays, refunds, and bonuses introduced at the retail 
level depend on the degree to which retailers accept (pass-through rates) promotional 
programs. Thus, especially with scanner data, researchers who estimate competitive 
reaction functions should create models that reflect the roles of both the manufac-
turers and the retailers. 
Another issue is the interpretation of the signs in the competitive reaction functions. 
For example, the question is whether a negative sign is a reaction, or just an association 
between two variables. The answer touches on causality issues. Leeflang and Wittink 
(1992) develop models that explicitly account for these roles. I do not discuss how these 
roles are reflected in their models, but concentrate on their basic model. Using weekly 
scanner data that refer to 76 weeks and seven brands, the authors consider the following 
marketing instruments: price (p), sampling (free products and gifts) (sa), refunds 
(giving money back on, for example, a bank account) (rf), bonus offers (more content 
of a product at the same price) (bo), and featuring (retailer advertising) (ft). For each 
brand, the authors estimate competitive reaction functions for each marketing instrument 
and express the criterion variables in the competitive reaction function as changes. For 
example, the logarithm of the ratio of prices in two successive periods represents price, 
because price changes for brands with different regular price levels are more comparable 
on a percentage basis rather than on an absolute basis. In this way the authors also circum-
vent price inflation issues.
Leeflang and Wittink (1992) specify other promotional activities in terms of simple differ-
ences, because zero values may occur in these cases. Such values imply that logarithms 
cannot be used. To illustrate the price of brand j (pjt), the authors specify the following 
competitive reaction function: 
ln ( pjt ____ pj,t – 1) = αj +   ∑ r = 1,r ≠ j 
n
   ∑ 
t* = 1
 
T* + 1
 βjrt* ln ( pr, t – t*+ 1 ______pr, t – t* ) +  ∑ 
t* = 2
 
T *+ 1
 βjjt* ln ( pj, t – t*+ 1 ______pj, t – t*  ) (19)
 +   ∑ 
r = 1
n
   ∑ 
t* = 1
 
T* + 1
  ∑ 
x = 1
4
  τxjrt* (xr, t – t*+ 1 – xr, t – t*) + εjt
for j = 1, …, n and t = T * + 2, …, T; 
where x = 1 = sa; x = 2 = rf; x = 3 = bo; x = 4 = ft; T * is the maximum 
number of time lags (T* = 10); T is the number of observations available; n is the 
number of brands; and εjt is a disturbance term.
Equation (19) also includes lagged endogenous variables. These variables account for 
the phenomenon that periods with heavy promotions are frequently followed by periods 
with relatively low promotional efforts. Equation (19) makes it clear that the number 
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of predictor variables is so large that they easily exceed the number of observations. For 
example, suppose that n = 7 (brands), each with five instruments, T* = 10 (lagged 
periods), and T = 76. Thus one would have 76 observations to estimate 391 parameters, 
under the assumption that all manufacturers use all marketing instruments. Therefore, in 
their model, Leeflang and Wittink (1992) use bivariate causality tests to select potentially 
relevant predictor variables (see also, Bult et al. (1997))10.
3.4  extenDeD lnB moDels with aDvanCeD DemanD FunCtions
In these models, researchers relax the assumptions that a limited number of marketing 
instruments of one competitive brand affects the demand function. This relaxation also 
leads to improved specifications. A customer-focused approach relies on information 
about consumers’ sensitivity to changes in marketing instruments; that is, it considers esti-
mated market response functions. I discuss an example in which demand is specified at the 
market-share level. I assume competitive behavior is asymmetric. The structure of the model 
example (developed by Leeflang and Wittink (1996)) is similar to that used for the compet-
itive reactions (Equation (19)). The criterion variable is the natural logarithm of the ratio 
of market shares in successive periods for brand j = 1, …, n: ln(mjt/mj,t – 1), which 
in turn is a function of the natural logarithm of the ratio of prices in successive periods 
and the first differences of the four promotional variables introduced before of all brands 
r = 1, …, n:
ln ( 
mjt
 _______ mj,t – 1) = λj +  ∑ r = 1
n
   ∑ 
t* = 1
 
T* + 1
 γjrt*  ln( pr, t – t*+ 1 ______pr, t – t* ) (20)
  +  ∑ 
r = 1
n
   ∑ 
t * = 1
 
T * + 1
  ∑ 
x = 1
4
  ξ xjrt* (xr, t – t*+ 1 – xr, t – t*) + ujt 
where ujt is a disturbance term, p represent prices and the x’s are the non-price promo-
tional variables. Leeflang and Wittink confront these demand equations with the more 
advanced competitive reaction functions (19). Leeflang and Wittink (1996) have also 
calibrated this model, using weekly data that covers 76 weeks.
3.5  FRamewoRk anD CRoss taBulations
The framework approach can enhance the congruence between competitor-oriented 
and customer-focused decision-making, because the framework itself relates consumer 
response and competitive reaction effects and thus provides a basis for categorizing 
over- and under-reactions by managers. Hence, this approach combines advanced 
10 For a discussion of other models that calibrate competitive reaction functions, see Kadiyali et al. (1999); Vilcas-
sim et al. (1999). In all cases, the reaction functions attempt to capture the use of marketing instruments to re-
act to changes in other instruments without regard to consumer responses.
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competitive reaction functions with advanced demand functions. The combination of 
different models leads to the next step in the evolutionary model-building process. 
In the framework approach which is used by Leeflang and Wittink (1996) there are 
three kinds of elasticities: reaction elasticity, cross-elasticity, and own elasticity. For 
simplification, the framework is restricted to the absence or presence of effects, such 
that the elasticities are either zero or not, which results in eight possible combinations 
(see Table 1). Leeflang and Wittink (1996) consider two brands: the defender brand i 
and the attacker brand j. Brand i uses marketing instrument ℓ to react to an attack of 
brand j.
Table 1: A framework of cross-market share-, competitive reaction, and own-market 
share effects
Cross-Brand	market	Share	effect
YeS no
own-Brand	
market	Share	
effect
Competitive	Reaction	effect Competitive	Reaction	effect
YeS no YeS no
a C e g
YeS intense	competition Underreaction;
Lost	opportunity	
for	defendera
Defender’s	game no	competition
B D f H
no Spoiled	arms	for		
defendera
ineffective	arms overreaction;	Spoiled	
arms	for	defendera
no	competition
a	note	that	the	defender	brand	may	lack	information	about	its	own-brand	market	share	effects.
Source:	Leeflang	and	Wittink	(1996,	106)	
In cell A of Table 1 all three effects are non-zero, which implies intense competition. 
Thus, brand i uses marketing instrument ℓ to restore its market share, influenced by 
brand j’s use of variable h. In the presence of a cross-brand market-share effect, brand j 
cannot recover its loss of market share if the own-brand market share effect is zero, as in 
cell B; there is no competitive reaction effect, as in cell C; or there is neither a compet-
itive reaction effect nor an own-brand market share effect, as in cell D. In Table 1, Cell 
B indicates the use of an ineffective instrument (“spoiled arms”) chosen by i to react to 
j. Cell C represents under-reactions, such that brand i should defend its market share 
but does not react, even though instrument ℓ is effective. Leeflang and Wittink (1996) 
define this case as a lost opportunity for defender i. If there are no reaction effects and 
the own-brand market share elasticities equal zero, Leeflang and Wittink (1996) recog-
nize ineffective arms (cell D).
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If there is no cross-brand market share effect, then competitive reaction effects should 
not occur if the firm’s objective is simply to preserve its market share. In the third 
column in Table 1, cells E through F identify some associated overreactions. In cell E 
(defender’s game), the reactions include an instrument that has an own-brand effect, 
even though no cross-brand market share effect exists. Cell F involves (unnecessary) 
reactions with an ineffective instrument. Cells G and H reflect no competition because 
of the absence of both a cross-brand market-share effect and a competitive reaction 
effect.
This framework suggests that knowledge about cross- and own-brand market-share 
effects enables managers to better prepare themselves for competitors’ activities in terms 
of whether and which reactions are desirable. Thus, a consumer-focused approach 
that captures consumer responses to marketing helps management diagnose com- 
petition. Although the estimation of reaction matrixes captures the nature of compet-
itive reactions, it falls short of explaining reaction patterns. In other words, it fails to 
provide sufficient insight into the underlying reasons for the observed reactions (Ramas-
wamy et al. (1994); Kadiyali et al. (2001)). Another drawback of competitive reaction 
models involves understanding who is the defender and who is the attacker, i.e., the 
one that initiates a move. In response, researchers developed the VARX and the NEIO 
models to provide such insights. The availability of more data (scanner data at the store 
level) and new methods (VARX modeling) determine this step in the evolutionary 
model-building process.
3.6  vaRx moDels
Modern time-series analysis (TSA) offers the opportunity to use demand functions and 
reaction functions simultaneously to diagnose and predict competition. VARX models 
can be used in cases in which the marketer wants to account for the dynamic effects 
of marketing instruments on the sales of individual brands in a market and when, or 
distinguish among immediate (instantaneous), gross, and net effects. The direct effects 
again refer to the unaltered influence of marketing actions on a performance measure; 
indirect effects capture their impact on performance through competitive (or other) 
reactions. Among the direct effects, I distinguish between immediate effects and gross 
effects, or the sum of the direct effects over a specified time horizon. In addition, the net 
effects reflect the sum of the direct and indirect effects measured during the same time 
horizon and therefore account for competitive reactions, whereas gross effects do not. 
To estimate immediate, gross, and net effects, I use impulse response analyses (IRA). I 
illustrate the use of a VARX model by discussing a model specified and calibrated by 
Horvàth  et al. (2005). This model simultaneously considers advanced market response 
and advanced competitive reaction functions, and relies for calibration on pooled store 
data for each of three brands of tuna fish11.
11 I closely follow Horvàth et al. (2005). For a thorough discussion of VARX models see also Dekimpe et al. 
(2008).
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3.6.1 Response FunCtions
The (advanced) demand functions in this example are adaptations of AC Nielsen’s 
SCAN*PRO model (see, e.g., Christen et al. (1997)) in which the variables of interest are the 
logarithms of the unit sales and price indexes (the ratio of actual to regular price) for brands 
at the store level. The SCAN*PRO model includes several own- and cross-brand promo-
tional variables: price index, feature only, display only, and feature and display. Horvàth et al. 
(2005) extend this model by including dynamic price promotion effects (delayed responses) 
and purchase reinforcement effects (through lagged sales). However, I do not include sepa-
rate lagged non-price instruments to reduce concerns about the degrees of freedom. Horvàth 
et al. allow for additional dynamic effects through lagged endogenous variables. Horvàth et 
al. define two types of price promotion variables: own- and other-brand temporary discounts 
without support, and own- and other-brand temporary discounts with feature and/or display 
support. By definition, such promotion variables are minimally correlated. 
All parameters are brand specific and all lagged variables have unique parameters. Horvàth 
et al. (2005) specify the market response function as:
ln Sqi,t = αqi +  ∑ 
k = 1
2
  ∑ 
j = 1
n
  ∑ 
t* = 0
 
 P ijk 
SP 
β PIijk,t* lnPIqjk,t – t* +  ∑ 
j = 1
n
  ∑ 
t* = 1
 
 P ij 
SP 
φij,t*ln Sqi,t –t* (21)
 +  ∑ 
j = 1
n
 βFij Fqj,t +  ∑ 
j = 1
n
 βDij Dqj,t +  ∑ 
j = 1
n
 βFDij FDqj,t + εqi,t,
q = 1, …, Q, i = 1, …, n, and t = 1, …, T
where lnSqi, is the natural logarithm of sales of brand i in store q in week t; lnPIqik,t is 
log price index (actual to regular price) of brand i in store q in week t; (k = 1 denotes 
the feature/display-supported price cuts and k = 2 denotes price cuts that are not 
supported); Fqj,t is a feature-only dummy variable for non-price promotions of brand j 
in store q at time t; Dqj,t is a display-only dummy variable for non-price promotions of 
brand j in store q at time t; FDqj, t is the combined use of feature and display supports 
of non-price promotions of brand j in store q at time t 12; αqi is a store-specific intercept 
for brand i and store q; βPIijk,t* = (pooled) elasticity of brand i’s sales with respect to 
brand j’s price index; φij,t* is the (pooled) substitution elasticity of brand i’s sales with 
respect to competitive (j) sales in week t (i ≠ j); βFij, βDij, βFDij are the effects of 
feature-only (F ), display-only (D), and feature and display (FD);  P ijk 
SP represents the 
number of lags for price index variable k of brand i included in the equation for brand 
j;  P ij 
SP is the number of lags of the sales variable of brand i included in the equation for 
brand j; n is the number of brands in the product category; Q is the number of stores; 
and εqi,t are disturbances. Horvàth et al. (2005) test for the equality of slopes across 
stores and fail to reject this null hypothesis. Therefore, the specification of the demand 
12 The variables F, D, and FD only deviate from zero only if a feature/display exists but there is no price dis-
count. 
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model does not allow for slope heterogeneity. This specification captures purchase rein-
forcement φii,t, immediate sales response (βPlijk,t* for t* = 0), and delayed response 
(βPlijk,t* for t* > 0).
3.6.2  ReaCtion FunCtions
In the preceding discussion, I define the competitive reactions as the reactions of 
brand managers to the marketing activities of other brands, but this reaction is not the 
only possible type of reaction, nor is it necessarily the most efficient one. For example, 
managers often track market share or sales, and a drop in either measure may prompt 
them to react with a marketing instrument. Similarly, they track other brands’ perfor-
mances and may interpret an increase as a competitive threat. Therefore, Incorporate 
these ideas as feedback effects in the reaction functions (compare also Kotler (1965)). 
These reaction functions also include price indexes as in (21). However, I may doubt 
whether competitors react to price indexes. Horvàth et al. (2005) use these indexes 
instead of regular or promotional prices because VARX models require the same set 
of model variables. The reaction functions also account for inertia in decision-making 
and coordination between own-brand instruments (internal decisions):
lnPIqiℓ,t = δqiℓ +  ∑ 
t* = 1
 
 P iiℓℓ 
PP 
 γil,t* lnPIqiℓ,t – t* +   ∑ 
t* = 1,k ≠ ℓ
 
 P iiℓk 
PP
γik,t* lnPIqik,t – t* (22)
 +  ∑ 
k = 1
2
     ∑ 
j = 1, j ≠ i
 
n
    ∑ 
t* = 1
 
 P ijℓk 
PP
 γiℓjk,t* lnPIqjk,t – t*  
 
 +  ∑ 
j = 1
n
     ∑ 
t* = 1
 
 P ijℓ 
PS 
ηij,t* ln Sqj,t – t* + νqiℓ,t
where the variables are defined as in equation (21) (ℓ = 1, 2). The super- and subin-
dexes of P indicate that the number of included lags may vary per equation and per 
variable. Equation (22) thus captures internal decisions (inertia in decision making: 
γil,t*, intrafirm effects: γik,t*, k ≠ ℓ), competitive reactions (γiℓjk,t*, j ≠ i), and own-
brand (ηii,t*) and cross-brand (ηij,t*, j ≠ i) feedback effects, which refer to reactions 
to the consequence of an action. If marketing managers who track their own-brand 
market share or sales perceive a decrease in either measure, they may react by changing 
their marketing activities. They may also track and react to other brands’ performance 
(cross-feedback effects). Horvàth et al. (2005) estimate a VARX model based on Equa-
tions (21) and (22) using two data sets covering two years of observations of weekly data. 
The data sets represent 24 (tuna fish) and 27 (shampoo) stores.
Before I continue my discussion of the possibilities of modeling competitive behavior, I 
believe a summary is appropriate. Thus far, I have described six different approaches. I 
summarize their characteristics in Table 2.
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Table 2:  Characteristics of methods to model competitive response for individual 
brands
Method Characteristics
(1) Classical	de-
mand	models
Simple,	no	interactions	among	actions,	reactions	and	response.
(2) Classical	LnB	
model
interactions,	aggregation	of	competitive	brands,	horizontal	competition,	no		
effects	of	retailers’	decisions.
(3-5) extended	LnB	
models
interactions,	actions	and	reactions	of/on	individual	brands,	horizontal	competi-
tion,	accounting	for	effects	of	retailers’	decisions,	no	simultaneous	equation		
system	(framework	instead),	no	explanations	of	reactions.
(6) VaRX	models interactions,	individual	brands,	horizontal	competition,	accounting	for	retail-
ers’	decisions,	simultaneous	equation	system	with	emphasis	on	dynamic	effects,	
some	explanation	of	competitive	moves.
The models (1)-(6) constitute a string of models that were developed by generations of 
model builders in an evolutionary way. This evolution covers a period of more than 30 
year (1975-2005). The models we have discussed so far all assume that each manager 
treats the competitors’ strategies as a given and computes his or her own best response. In 
the models that we will discuss next, managers achieve simultaneous solutions for, at least 
in principle, all relevant brands in the marketplace. Such simultaneous solutions call for 
game-theoretic approaches.
3.7  Game-theoRetiC moDels
The preceding discussions make it clear that in the market place, managers consider not 
only their perceptions of consumer responses, but also their expectations of competitor 
reactions to a potential marketing initiative. These complexities make the choice of an 
action in a competitive situation intractable, because the optimal choice for one brand 
depends on what other brands may do, which in turn depends on what the focal brand 
does, and so on (Moorthy (1985)). 
Game theory offers a way to study these interdependencies13. The game-theoretic models 
of competitive responsiveness result from applying existing approaches to ‘new’ prob-
lems. Game-theoretic models are based on the assumption that competitors’ strategies are 
13 For more complete treatments of game theory in a marketing context, see Hanssens et al. (2001); Erickson 
(1991); Moorthy (1985; 1993). A managerial treatment of game theoretic principles appears in Brandenburger 
and Nalebuff (1996). For a general introduction to modern game theory, see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991); Mas-
Collell et al. (1995).
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given. In these models, one is interested in the specification of optimal marketing deci-
sions for all (relevant) brands. The game-theoretic models originate from another branch 
of models, which is different from the models (1-6) discussed so far. In other words, they 
do not result from previous steps in the evolutionary process that I describe above.
Game theory separates into cooperative and non-cooperative categories. Cooperative game 
theory examines the behavior of colluding firms by maximizing a weighted average of all 
firms’ profits. If two firms with profits π1 and π2 then:
 max  
xℓj
 π = λ π1 + (1 – λ)π2 (23)
where λ is the weight for firm 1; and xℓj is the marketing instrument ℓ of firm j, j = 1, 
2, ℓ = 1, …, L. In empirical studies, the weight λ is determined by the data.
In the real world, competition takes place among a few competitors with interdependent 
interests such that each competitor’s actions affect the others. This situation is character-
ized by strategic competition, which requires non-cooperative game theory. The Nash 
(1950) theory of equilibrium represents the central concept of noncooperative game 
theory and involves a set of strategies, one for each competitor, defined such that no 
competitor wants unilaterally to change its strategy. In a Nash equilibrium, each strategy 
is a competitor’s best option, given the best strategies of its rivals, where the meaning of 
“best” depends on specified objectives. If the objective is profit, Nash equilibriums are 
obtained for all ℓ and j:
 
δπj
 ___
δxℓj
 = 0, j = 1, …, n, ℓ = 1, …, L (24)
where πj = f(xℓj).
3.8 the new empiRiCal inDustRial oRGanization (neio)-BaseD appRoaCh:  
hoRizontal Competition
The move from theoretical, static game-theoretic models to empirical, dynamic models 
has shifted attention from normative models to descriptive game theory, which implies 
using game-theoretic models to test whether marketplace data are consistent with model 
specifications. Empirical research in marketing strategy examines the impact of cost 
and competitive characteristics of a market on the profitability of a firm and gener-
ally follows the (market) structure-conduct (marketing mix, entry of new products, 
R&D expenditures) -performance(profitability)-paradigm (SCP paradigm) of empirical 
industrial organization (EIO) theory. Empirical studies use cross-sectional data across 
industries to find empirical regularities. Research that applies advanced game theory 
has also led to the insights that conduct and performance are not merely functions of 
structural market characteristics, such as concentration, growth, barriers to entry, and 
product differentiation, which are used in SCP studies. These insights provide the basis 
for NEIO studies. These studies focus on developing and estimating structural econo-
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metric models of strategic, competitive behavior by firms, in which context “struc-
tural” means that the firm’s decisions are based on some kind of optimizing behavior, 
and “econometric models” reflect simultaneous equations of demand and supply of all 
relevant competitors. 
Usually, an NEIO model contains the following ingredients: demand functions, cost 
functions, specifications for competitive interactions, and an objective function (usually 
a profit function). Furthermore, the consecutive steps required to specify and estimate 
empirical game theory models are: 
1. Specify demand functions (including competitive marketing instruments).
2. Specify cost functions. 
3. Specify objective functions (usually profit functions). 
4. Specify the game. 
5. Derive first-order conditions for optimal marketing instruments. 
6. Add observed variables to identify the system.
7. Estimate the models.
Simultaneous equation models usually rely on a simultaneous equation instrumental vari-
able approach for estimation, such as the three-stage least squares (3SLS), full information 
maximum likelihood (FIML), and generalized method of moments (GMM) approaches. 
Dubé et al. (2005) discuss various other computational and methodological issues, and 
Chintagunta et al. (2006) offer a review of structural modeling in marketing. Roy et al. 
(2006) compare the methods proposed in the NEIO studies. 
As an example, I cite Gasmi et al. (1992), who investigate the behavior of Coca-Cola 
and Pepsi, using quarterly data covering 18 years from the United States about quan-
tity sold, price and advertising. They estimate various model specifications to allow for 
the possible existence of both cooperative and noncooperative strategic behavior in this 
industry (“the game”). Their work specifies an objective function for each firm (profit 
function), as well as demand and cost functions. Using these specifications, they obtain 
a system of simultaneous equations based on assumptions about the firms' behavior. 
Throughout their work, they also assume a one-to-one relation between firm j and brand 
j and therefore use those terms interchangeably. Gasmi et al. (1992) propose the following 
demand function for brand j:
qj = γj0 + αjj pj + αjr pr + γjj  a j 
1/2 + γjr  a r 
1/2 , j ≠ r, j, r = 1, 2 (25)
where qj is the quantity demanded from brand j; pj is the price per unit for brand j, and 
aj is the advertising expenditure for brand j.
I omit an error term and a subscript t for time periods from Equation (25) for conve-
nience. To illustrate the use of this model, I assume the cost function is:
Cj(qj) = cj qj, (26)
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where cj is the constant variable cost per unit of brand j.
Therefore, I can write the profit function as:
πj =   pj qj – Cj(qj) – aj (27)
 = (pj – cj)(γj0 + αjj pj + αjr pr + γjr  a j 
1/2  + γjr  a r 
1/2 ) – aj.
In addition, Gasmi et al. (1992) consider six games:
1. Firms set prices and advertising expenditures simultaneously (naive static Nash 
behavior in price and advertising).
2. Firm j = 1 is the leader in both price and advertising, and firm r = 2 is the 
follower.
3. Firm j = 1 is the leader in price, but the two firms “behave Nash” in advertising.
4. Total collusion exists, which maximizes Equation (23), a weighted average of both 
firms’ profits.
5. Firms first collude on advertising, and later compete on prices.
6. Firms collude on price, knowing that they will compete later on advertising expen-
ditures.
The first three games are based on noncooperating behavior, and the last three games 
consider tacit collusion.
Gasmi et al. (1992) include additional exogenous variables and specify functions for the 
demand intercepts (γj0) and marginal costs (cj), which makes the system identifiable. 
These functions, together with the demand functions in Equation (25), can be estimated 
as a system of simultaneous equations. Thus, they derive a general model specification, 
which they use to test the six games. The empirical results suggest that for the period 
covered by the sample (1968-1986), there was tacit collusive behavior between Coca-Cola 
and Pepsi in their advertising in the market for cola drinks, though collusion on prices is 
not as well supported by the data. Thus, the results favor the specification for game 5.
The Gasmi et al. (1992) study deals with horizontal competition and collusion, but their 
model can also be extended to consider vertical competition/collusion between competi-
tors/partners in the marketing system (Jeuland and Shugan (1983)). The structure of the 
demand Equation (25) also appears in other game-theoretic models, such as studies by 
Kadiyali (1996) and Putsis and Dhar (1999). For other demand equations, see Vidale and 
Wolfe (1957)14. Furthermore, in the past decade, aggregate logit models have become the 
prevalent demand functions15. This development also follows an evolutionary approach 
in which an earlier specification is improved over time. This development also holds for 
the next group of models, NEIO models that study vertical competition.
14 Also see Kimball (1957), and for examples, see Chintagunta and Vilcassim (1994); Erickson (1991); Naik et al. 
(2005).
15 See, for example, Chintagunta and Rao (1996); Sudhir (2001); Sudhir et al. (2005).
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3.9  neio-BaseD appRoaCh: veRtiCal Competition
The eight sets of models that I have discussed thus far deal primarily with horizontal 
competition. Therefore, these models cannot be applied if the focal company confronts 
vertical competition, which, in modern Western markets, almost always refers to compe-
tition between manufacturers and retailers. Historically, retailers have been local, frag-
mented, and technically primitive, which made it easy for some powerful multinational 
manufacturers to push them around. Within the span of two or three decades, this situ-
ation has become history. The largest retailers now enjoy global footprints, which has 
shifted power structures and increased vertical competition in the channels. 
Many game-theoretic models deal with vertical competition, especially pass-through in 
channels, i.e., how retailers actually allocate the amount of money offered by manufac-
turers that is intended to stimulate consumer demand. Hence we are confronted with the 
application of an existing approach to a “new” problem. Models that consider vertical 
competition must simultaneously optimize the objective functions of at least two partners. 
Therefore, researchers apply game-theoretic approaches to determine joint, simultaneous 
solutions. As an example, I discuss the (general) structure of the pass-through model devel-
oped by Moorthy (2005), who considers two retailers (1 and 2), each with two brands, 1 
and 2, such that brand 1 is common to both retailers and brand 2 is a private label. If Dij, 
i = 1, 2 , j = 1, 2, denotes brand j’s demand function at retailer i, the demand func-
tions become the functions of all four retail prices: p11, p21, p12, and p22. Then, retailer 
i’s (i = 1, 2) category profit function is given by:
πi(̃p) = (pi1 – w1 – ci1 – ci – c)Di1(̃ p) + (pi2 – ci2 – ci – c)Di2(̃ p) (28)
where ̃ p equals (p11, p21, p12, p22), w1 is the wholesale price of the national brand, 
usually assumed to be common to both retailers; ci1, ci2 represents the retailers i’s non-
brand-specific marginal operating costs; and c represents the non-retailer-specific, non-
brand-specific marginal operating costs. 
Because brand 2 is a private label, the model provides no specific wholesale price for it. 
If the vector of marginal costs (w1, ci1, ci, c) is taken as given and assuming that the 
demand functions are available, Moorthy is able to determine the optimal retail prices 
for both brands of both retailers. Solving the system of four first-order conditions leads 
to optimal price determinations, at least in principle16. Moorthy’s (2005) is a non-empir-
ical study.
3.10 time-vaRyinG Competition
Normative models suggest that prices rise when demand and cost are higher, but in many 
markets, prices fall when demand or costs rise. This inconsistency occurs because norma-
16 The system of equations should have a negative-definite Hessian matrix. See for a similar model Villas-Boas and 
Zhao (2005).
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tive models assume that competitive intensity is constant over time. Time-varying compe-
tition models do not assume about constant competitive intensity. These models explicitly 
consider the so-called indirect effects of demand and cost changes on competition, which 
complement the direct effects of demand and cost on prices17. 
The idea of integrating competitive intensity in a game-theoretic model can be illustrated 
as follows. Consider a profit function πjt of brand j at t,
 max  
(pjt)
 πjt = Mt(pjt – cjt)mjt (29)
where Mt is the potential size of the market at time t; pjt is the price per unit at time t; 
cjt is the cost per unit at time t; and mjt is the market share of brand j at t, where mjt is 
a function of Pjt.
Solving the first-order conditions for profit maximization under the assumption of Nash-
Bertrand equilibrium, I find
pjt = cjt –  
mjt
 ____
 
δmjt
 _____
δpjt
 
 . (30)
Therefore, the so-called Bertrand margin is
 margin jt 
Bertr.  =  –  
mjt
 ____
 
δmjt
 _____
δpjt
 
 . (31)
In addition, I can capture the indirect effect of changes in competitive intensity on price 
by introducing a multiplier wjt on the Bertrand margin. I can then specify the pricing 
equation as:
pjt = cjt + wjt   margin jt 
Bertr.  . (32)
The multiplier wjt is a function of the predictor variables that affect competitive behavior. 
The interpretation of wjt is as follows: When wjt > (<) 1, firm j is pricing cooperatively 
(competitively) relative to the Bertrand equilibrium. At wjt = 0, firm j prices at marginal 
cost. Sudhir et al. (2005) use quarterly dummy variables, which measure consumer confi-
dence, costs of material and labor, and so forth, as predictor variables. By doing so, they 
explicitly model the indirect effects of demand and cost changes on competition. 
3.11 DynamiC, empiRiCal Game-theoRetiC moDels
The last link in the evolutionary chain of building models of competitive response consists 
of dynamic, empirical game-theoretic models. The model developed by Ailawadi et al. 
(2005) comprises the following equations: demand equations for all brands in a product 
17 See Sudhir et al. (2005).
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category, the objective function of a retailer, and the objective function of a competi-
tive brand. The context of the model that Ailawadi et al. (2005) consider is the retailers’ 
and consumers’ response to Procter & Gamble’s (P&G) value pricing strategy, under 
which P&G made major cuts in promotions and provided a lower everyday price to its 
customers. Ailawadi et al. (2005) conduct their analysis for a local market and model the 
channel structure as a dynamic series of Manufacturer-Retailer Stackelberg games. In each 
period, P&G, the manufacturer of brand 1 is the leader and the retailer is the follower. I 
discuss the most important equations of the Ailawadi et al. model below:
Demand equations:
Sits = αis +  ∑ 
k = 1
K
  βiks RPkts +  ∑ 
k = 1
K
  γiks RDkts + δ1isCDits (33)
  + δ2is(CDits)(RDits)
CDits = λi CDits – 1 + (1 – λi)RDits – 1 (34)
where Sits is the unit sales of brand i in week t in store s; i, k = 1, 2, 3 (1 is P&G, 2 
is a competing national brand, and brand 3 is a private label); RPkts, RDkts is the regular 
retail price and regular deal amount per unit (discount) of brand k in week t in store s; 
CDits is cumulative dealing, i.e., the exponentially smoothed average of past retail deal 
amount for i, in t, in s; and λi is an exponential smoothing parameter.
The retailer decides about the prices RPit of the three brands and what retail deal amount 
to offer on the private label RD3ts. She also decides how much of the national brands 
should be ordered (X1t, X2t). These order quantifiers are defined as X1t and X2t. There-
fore the retailer’s objective function is:
 max    
 RP1t,RP2t,RP3t,  __________
RD3t,X1t,X2t
 
  ∑ 
t = 1
T
 { [  ∑ 
i = 1
2
 (RPit – kDitIit)Sit – (WPit – Dit)Xit – hiINVit]  (35)
 + (RP3t – VC – RDst)S3t}
where WPit is the wholesale price; D is the trade deal amount offered by the manufac-
turer; k is the percentage of the trade-deal amount that the retailer offers to consumers 
in the weeks when she orders an trade deal; h is the retailer’s unit inventory holding cost 
per period; VC is the variable cost of the private label to the retailer; I is an order indi-
cator variable that is equal to one if an order is placed, and zero otherwise, and INV is 
inventor y defined as:
INVit = INVi,t – 1 + Xi,t – 1 – Si,t – 1 i = 1, 2. (36)
Given that the retailer can order products prior to period t, the optimization of retail 
prices, the trade deal amount, and the order quantities are a dynamic programming 
problem.
p. 	S.	H.	LeefLang
	 	
	 	
	
344	 sbr	60	october	2008		322-358
Another important equation is the competing manufacturer’s objective function, i.e., the 
objective function of brand 2. The brand 2 profit depends on whether the retailer buys 
from brand 2 or carries brand 2 forward from the last purchase order.
Brand 2’s objective function is:
 max    
WP2t,D2t
 ∑ 
t = 1
T
 {I2t(WP2t – VC – D2t)S2t + (1 – I2t)( WP L2t – VC –  D L2t )S2t} (37)
where  WP L2t and  D L2t are the wholesale price and the trade deal for brand 2 when it was last ordered by the retailer prior to period t. 
Ailawadi et al. (2005) generate predictions of competitor and retailer responses and test 
their accuracy. To do so, they use weekly scanner data from stores in the Chicago market. 
The data represent the sales, deals, prices, etc., of nine product categories and over six 
years. Ailawadi et al. compare the predictive ability of their model with the reaction func-
tion approach (Leeflang and Wittink (1992; 1996)) and a dynamic model that assumes 
the retailer is nonstrategic. The dynamic, empirical game-theoretic model has better 
predictive ability than either benchmark model. Thus, such models provide the means to 
account for important changes in competitive strategy (see also Shugan (2005)) and are 
more consistent with strategic competitive reasoning than with the extrapolation of past 
reactions to the future.
It is clear that this model has evolved from several existing approaches and models, viz., 
NEIO models with horizontal (Set 8) and vertical competition (Set 9) which is time-
varying (Set 10). The models also combine advanced demand functions (Set 4) with 
advanced competitive reaction functions (Set 3). Hence, the evolutionary steps are based 
on combinations of different research models. The models (7), (8), (9), and (11) consti-
tute an evolutionary path that covers a time period of about 180 years. With the devel-
opment of the empirical game-theoretic models in the past 15 years, these models have 
proved their value in the area of competitive responsiveness. I expect that the dynamic, 
empirical game-theoretic models can be improved in the near future through the applica-
tion of Dynamic Linear Models (DLM)18.
4  findings
The study of competition and competitive response has a long tradition in microeconomic 
theory, starting with the work of Cournot (1838) and Bertrand (1883), and continuing 
with the development of multiple models of competitive responsiveness in the past 30 
years. These studies on competitive responsiveness can be classified according to different 
(overlapping) criteria, such as19 area of application, type of competition, type of competi-
tive strategies, and type of analyses. To expand on my summary of different types of anal-
18 See Van Heerde et al. (2004); Ataman et al. (2006); Ataman et al. (2007).
19 See also Horvàth (2003), which is based on Leeflang (2001).
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yses in Section 3, here I discuss several examples of studies that employ the first three 
criteria. 
4.1  aRea oF appliCation
Most studies on competitive responsiveness refer to frequently purchased consumer goods 
(FPCG) and consider manufacturers’ actions and reactions. The most prominent examples 
are studies by Nijs et al. (2001), and Steenkamp et al. (2005), who study 1,200 brands 
of 442 FPCG categories. Several studies analyze competition in durable goods markets. 
For example, Lambin et al. (1975) investigate competition among manufacturers of elec-
tronic razors in the West German market, Sudhir (2001) studies car markets, and Kadi-
yali (1996) and Sudhir et al. (2005) address the competitive responsiveness of two major 
players in the U.S. photographic film industry market. 
In another arena, Jain et al. (1999) and Roberts et al. (2005) examine competition in the 
telephone industry by specifically considering service competition. Cleeren et al. (2006) 
study the competition of local services and model the entry of a new player on the video-
rental market.
More recently, the numerous and rapid developments in information technology, espe-
cially the diffusion of information via the Internet, have enhanced the focus on competi-
tion among retailers, wholesalers, and manufacturers, who can now offer products through 
many and varied channels. An empirical study by Balasubramanian (1998) analyzes 
the entry of direct book marketers into a retail market. Bakos and Brynjolfssen (2000) 
examine the Internet’s development as an infrastructure for distributing digital informa-
tion goods. They conclude that through the large-scale bundling of information goods, 
the Internet has dramatically influenced competitive marketing and selling strategies. 
Other studies that consider the competition between the Internet and conventional chan-
nels include Lynch and Ariely (2000), who study the wine market; Clay et al. (2001) 
and Goolsbee and Chevalier (2002) for books; and Sørensen (2000), who examines the 
prescription drugs industry.
More recent articles also explore competitive responses in the context of retailing; several 
examples include Desai and Purohit (2004), Shankar and Bolton (2004), Wang (2004), 
and Padmanabhan and Png (2004).
Examples of models of competitive responsiveness in business-to-business (B2B) markets 
are more difficult to find. Lilien and Yoon (1990) investigate entry timing for new indus-
trial products. Ramaswamy et al. (1994) consider competitive marketing behavior in 
industrial markets, and distinguish explicitly between retaliatory behavior (e.g., both firms 
cut prices or increase their marketing expenditures) and cooperative behavior (e.g., both 
competitors increase prices or decrease marketing expenditures). Ramaswamy et al. find 
that market concentration has the greatest impact on retaliatory behavior, although market 
growth and standardization also have a sizable influence, and that market growth has the 
greatest impact on cooperative behavior.
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Chintagunta and Desiraju (2005) assess pricing and retailing behavior in the pharmaceu-
tical industry for a specific class of prescription drugs across five countries. Therefore, their 
model accommodates market responses within markets and interfirm strategic interactions 
both within and across markets. These authors find considerable heterogeneity in prefer-
ences and market response across markets, which favor a regional strategic approach. 
Other studies on competitive responses in an international marketing context deal with 
the speed of international market rollouts. These studies suggest that brands typically 
follow two types of strategies: a fast-rollout “sprinkler” strategy, in which the brand enters 
several countries at the same time; or a slow-rollout “waterfall” strategy, in which the 
brand enters several markets sequentially over time (Kalish et al. (1995)). Other studies 
in this field include those by Dekimpe et al. (2000), Tellis et al. (2003) and Gielens and 
Steenkamp (2004). 
4.2  type oF Competition
The type of competition is characterized by the marketing mix instruments that domi-
nate competition. For example, many competitive response models consider flexible price 
and non-price promotions and advertising20. Unlike quality and distribution instruments, 
such marketing strategies usually display significant variation over time. 
A topic that has received a great deal of attention in recent studies on competitive respon-
siveness is retail pass-through (Van Heerde and Neslin (2008)). The general problem of 
retail pass-through hinges on the question of how a retailer changes its prices when its 
costs change, either as a result of trade promotions or when a manufacturers change their 
regular wholesale prices. Retailers’ reactions to changes in costs appear in many studies, 
such as Neslin et al. (1995), Kim and Staelin (1999), Tyagi (1999), Kumar et al. (2001), 
Besanko et al. (2005), and Moorthy (2005). For example, Besanko et al. (2005) investi-
gate the pass-through behavior of a major U.S. supermarket chain for 78 products across 
11 categories. They find both positive and negative cross-brand pass-through effects, which 
indicates that retailers adjust the prices of competing products upward or downward in 
response to changes in the wholesale price of any particular product.
The oldest form of competition, price competition, continues to play a crucial role in 
many competitive response models, especially game-theoretic models. These models are 
used in studies by, e.g., Rao and Bass (1985), Dockner and Jørgensen (1988), Gasmi et al. 
(1992), Chintagunta and Rao (1996), Fruchter and Kalish (1997), Vilcassim et al. (1999), 
Hildebrandt and Klapper (2001), and Chintagunta and Desiraju (2005).
Moreover, modern research suggests a growing interest in calibrating competitive response 
models that deal with quality competition, as reflected in Lilien and Yoon (1990), Berndt 
et al. (1995), Dutta et al. (1995), Aoki and Prusa (1997), Lehmann-Grube (1997), Liu et 
20 Leeflang and Wittink (1992; 1996; 2001); Dubé and Manchanda (2005); Horvàth et al. (2005); Steenkamp et 
al. (2005).
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al. (2004), and Chambers et al. (2006). In another developing field, Cohen and Klepper 
(1996), Sutton (1998), and Ofek and Sarvary (2003) examine research and development 
competition.
Pauwels and Srinivasan (2004) also demonstrate that store brand entry strengthens a retail-
er’s bargaining position with regard to national brand manufacturers, though reactions to 
new entries have been studied in many other articles as well. A detailed description of the 
methods used in this context would require at least another article, so I mention only a 
few of the most important studies in this arena: Robinson (1988), Gatignon et al. (1989), 
Gatignon et al. (1997), Shankar ((1997); (1999)), Kalra et al. (1998), Narasimhan and 
Zang (2000), Waarts and Wierenga (2000), Deleersnijder et al. (2001), Debruyne and 
Reibstein (2005), Roberts et al. (2005), and Kornelis et al. (2008).
4.3  type oF Competitive stRateGies
Most models that consider competitive responsiveness assume that competitive reactions are 
based on past observations, but models that rely on historical data, no matter how successful 
in the short run, generally cannot predict the impact of any future changes in competi-
tive strategy21. Implementing entirely new (i.e., dynamic) strategies inevitably changes past 
behavior, and common marketing activities, such as new product development, reposi-
tioning, altering ancillary services, or major pricing-policy changes (Ailawadi et al. (2005)), 
alter the nature of competition among incumbents, thereby invalidating any relationships 
based on past observations. In turn, models must account for dynamic strategies, perhaps 
according to the principle of strategic foresight, a notion that requires managers to look 
forward and anticipate competing brands’ likely future decisions. Managers may then reason 
backward to deduce their own optimal decisions in response to the best decisions to be 
made by all other brands (Naik et al. (2005)). Day and Reibstein (1997) and Montgomery 
et al. (2005) both confirm the need to develop strategic models; specifically, Day and Reib-
stein (1997) identify two strategic errors, the failure to anticipate competitors’ moves (likely 
actions) and the failure to recognize potential interactions over time (reactions).
More recent models, such as those proposed by Rao et al. (1995), Chintagunta and Rao 
(1996), Vilcassim et al. (1999), Ailawadi et al. (2005), Dubé and Manchanda (2005) and 
Sudhir et al. (2005), also account for dynamic strategic decision making.
Another aspect that determines the type of competitive strategies is whether the focus is 
competition between firms/brands that is retaliatory behavior, or collusion, collusive/coop-
erative behavior. Gasmi et al. (1992) provide an empirical method for studying various 
forms of implicit and explicit collusive behavior in terms of price and advertising. 
21 I closely follow Shugan (2005).
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4.4  outComes
The models of competitive response that I introduce have generated outcomes of great 
value for policy decisions in actual practice. 
4.4.1  unDeR- anD oveR-ReaCtions
Leeflang and Wittink (1996) find that marketing managers of Dutch detergent brands 
tend to over-react, even though no reaction represents the dominant competitive response 
mode. In a replication study, Brodie et al. (1996) confirm Leeflang and Wittink’s finding 
with New Zealand data.
Steenkamp et al. (2005) study simple and multiple reactions to both price promo-
tions and advertising, including both short- and long-term effects. They also examine 
the moderating impact of brand- and category-related characteristics on competitive 
reaction elasticities. In contrast to Leeflang and Wittink (1992; 1996), Steenkamp 
et al. (2005) distinguish two types of reactions: accommodations, i.e., reductions in 
marketing support after a competitive attack; and retaliations. On the basis of this 
differentiation they find that the most common form of competitive reaction is passive 
(no reaction) when reactions occur, they are more often in response to price promotions 
than to advertising; retaliation with a price promotion against price promotion attacks 
is more common than any other action reaction combination; simple competitive reac-
tions are generally retaliatory, but multiple reactions can be either retaliatory or accom-
modating; and all forms of competitive reactions are generally restricted to short-term 
changes in brands’ marketing spending, which do not prompt permanent changes in 
spending behavior.
Because the most common form of competitive reaction is no reaction to an attack (cells 
C + D + G + H in Table 1), I question whether this decision is managerially sound, 
in the sense that sales protection appears unnecessary.  
4.4.2  explaininG Competitive ReaCtions
Dolan (1981) studies several industries and identifies four specific variables that deter-
mine the nature of competition: high fixed costs, which promote competitive reactions 
(to gain market share); low storage costs, which reduce competitive reactions; growing 
primary demand, which reduces competitive reactions; and large firms that avoid price 
competition.
Clark and Montgomery (1998) also propose and test a framework built around credibility 
and deterrence. Empirical results show that a credible reputation deters an attack if the 
potential attacker considers the target firm a minor competitor, but a major competitor 
is very likely to be attacked, independent of the target’s credibility; the more successful a 
firm is, the more likely it is perceived as a credible defender; and that consistently high 
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levels of marketing activity relative to competitors help a firm gain a reputation as a cred-
ible defender.
These results are intriguing. It seems reasonable, for example, that managers would go after 
major competitors because large firms have more demand share to lose. 
Chen et al. (1992) use a formal empirical approach to identify the characteristics of actions 
that lead to competitive reactions and test the hypothesized relationships with a sample of 
competitive moves among U.S. airlines. On the basis of their findings, they propose the 
following characteristics to explain competitive reactions. 
The competitive impact, which they define as the pervasiveness of an action’s effect on 
competitors, measured by the number of competitors actually affected by an action (i.e., 
the number of airlines that served in at least one of the airports affected by the action 
of the initiator).
The attack intensity, or the extent to which an action affects each competitor’s key 
markets, measured as the proportion of passengers served by the airline who potentially 
are affected by the action.
The implementation requirement, which refers to the degree of effort a firm requires to 
execute an action and reflects the amount of time between the announcement of an 
action and the date the action occurs (delay).
Type of action, in terms of its strategic versus tactical nature of an action, such that 
a strategic action includes a significant investment in fixed assets and/or people and 
structures, whereas tactical actions do not involve such commitments.
They further operationalize the competitive reaction variables by citing the number of 
responses, the total number of competitors who reacted to an action (the number of coun-
teractions), and the response lag, the length of time a competitor took to react to an initi-
ator’s action.
Chen et al. (1992) find that the number of competitive reactions relates positively to the 
competitive impact and attack intensity. Actions with greater implementation require-
ments and strategic (rather than tactical) actions provoke fewer counteractions, and that 
strategic actions and actions that require a substantial amount of time generate slower 
reactions.
Leeflang and Wittink (2001) use a more formal approach to explain competitive reaction 
effects. If brand j(uℓj) uses only one marketing instrument (ℓ) in reaction to a change in 
a marketing instrument h for brand i(uhi), then to preserve market share, the reaction 
elasticity (RE) must equal:
RE =  ρ u
ℓj
,u
hi  =  
 η mj,uhi  ____ η m
j
,u
ℓj 
 (38)
where  η mj,uhi  is the cross-elasticity for brand j with respect to i’s instruments, and  η mj,uℓj  
is the own elasticity for brand j with respect to j’s instrument ℓ. It follows from Equa-
n
n
n
n
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tion (38) that the reaction elasticity (RE ) relates positively to the (absolute) cross-
brand market share elasticity and negatively to the own-brand market share elasticity. 
In their empirical analysis, Leeflang and Wittink (2001) also find support for the idea 
that competitive reaction elasticities are a positive function of cross-brand market share 
elasticities, and a negative function of own-brand market share elasticities.
In their large-scale empirical study of short-run and long-run reactions to promotions 
and advertising shocks, Steenkamp et al. (2005) uncover several factors that affect 
the intensity of competitive reactions. For simple reactions with price promotions 
and advertising, the reactions are stronger when the attacker is more powerful, the 
relative power structure in the dyad favors the defenders, the category is less concen-
trated, and the interpurchase time is higher. Price promotion reactivity is stronger in 
categories that involve more impulse buying. Finally, advertising reactivity is lower 
in growing categories, for storable products, and in categories with lower advertising 
intensity.
In Section 3 I discussed the application of a VARX model to determine the simultaneous 
effects of actions and reactions on sales over time. In a similar vein, to estimate gross 
and net sales, Horvàth  et al. (2005) add forecasted sales effects over the dust-settling 
period and attempt to determine the impact on the sales effect of a firm’s own competi-
tive reactions; reactions to the consequences of own actions or competitive actions, i.e., 
own-feedback effects and cross-feedback effects, respectively; and internal decisions. (See 
also Equation (22)). The internal decisions represent intrafirm effects (relations between 
different variables of the same brand) and inertia (lagged endogenous variables). The 
Horvàth et al. research indicates that in terms of sales, cross-brand feedback effects are 
more relevant than are competitive reaction effects. This finding suggests that managers 
are more sensitive to competitors’ sales than they are to competitors’ actions. Thus, models 
must accommodate not only competitive reaction effects, but also cross-brand sales feed-
back effects. The same holds true for internal decisions: inertia and intrafirm decisions 
represent crucial determinants for specifying sales promotion decisions. These findings 
are in line with several recent studies that report that an aggressive competitive reaction 
does not constitute an important factor in market behavior (e.g., Pauwels (2004); Steen-
kamp et al. (2005)). 
5  taking stoCk: iMpleMentation
In this final section I distinguish among the models designed to support operational deci-
sions and models that can be used to support strategic decisions. Models 1-6 can, at least 
in principle, predict short-term (operational) reactions. By substituting appropriate values 
of the marketing instruments into equations such as Equation (19), marketers may deter-
mine competitive reactions. Because these reactions lead to new reactions, the system of 
equations represented by Equation (21) and (22) may be more appropriate for deter-
mining the effects on both competitive reactions and sales on the long (or longer) term. 
Such effects can be determined only with appropriate assumptions about the expected 
values of the competitive marketing instruments. I recommend simulations that can deter-
Competition
sbr	60	october	2008		322-358	 351
mine the sensitivity of competitive reactions to different assumptions about competitive 
actions.
However, demand functions such as those summarized in Equations (1), (10), and (20) 
are the most valuable for attempts to determine whether to react to competitive actions. In 
general, only a limited number of competitors, who possess a limited number of marketing 
instruments, can actually affect own sales. Therefore, any estimation of demand models 
that includes competitive marketing instruments provides a basis for normative decision 
making. Demand equations also offer the basis to decide whether to react and thus may 
reduce over- and under-reactions.
Normative decision-making in marketing that accounts for competitive actions and reac-
tions also may benefit from the findings and generalizations discussed in the preceding 
section, such that competitive reactions are stronger when the cross-brand elasticities are 
higher, and competitive reactions are weaker when the own-brand elasticities are higher.
Game-theoretic models assist normative decision making by determining the conditions 
for equilibriums between brands in the same product category (horizontal competition) 
and among agents (retailers, wholesalers, and manufacturers) in the same channel (vertical 
competition). Game-theoretic models based on empirical demand and reaction functions 
are useful in this type of scenario. 
However, there is still the question of whether competitive response models are adequate 
tools to predict strategic changes. Ailawadi et al. (2005) demonstrate that game-theoretic 
models that consider vertical and horizontal competition and that are based on empirical 
demand equations are superior to reaction-based models (e.g., models 2-6) for predicting 
actual competitor and retailer responses to a major policy change. Thus, although it is 
based on a simplified reality, Ailawadi et al.’s model is quite complicated. Furthermore, 
optimal decisions based on normative models can be obtained analytically only when the 
number of horizontal and vertical competitors is limited. When the number increases, it 
is difficult to obtain substantive analytical solutions. Therefore, I suggest using simulations 
of these more complicated demand and supply systems, which may provide a means to 
derive the optimal solutions. Hence I conclude that more sophistication does not always 
mean an increase in the probability of model implementation.
In turn, the remaining challenges for this research area require that there be more adequate 
methods and approaches for predicting strategic response (Montgomery et al. (2005)); 
tailored models to fit unique situations22; the development of models that are imple-
mented in practice, as well as the development of models that supply knowledge about 
how competitive responses are generated.
22 An example of the latter models is a prelaunch diffusion model for evaluating market defense strategies in the 
telecom sector developed by Roberts et al. (2005).
p. 	S.	H.	LeefLang
	 	
	 	
	
352	 sbr	60	october	2008		322-358
Following Shugan ((2004); (2005)), I believe that endogenizing competitive responses, 
i.e., adding more variables to the models, is beneficial. In this respect researchers might 
explore the ideas articulated by Soberman and Gatignon (2005), which suggest a link 
between competitive dynamics and market evolution. The potential link between these 
two areas offers many opportunities to enrich the theory of model evolution, as well as the 
theory and practice surrounding competitive responsiveness. New models that have the 
desired characteristics are at the end of the evolutionary model chain. However, I believe 
that, given the discussion above, there is room for different models for different niches.
In this respect I wish to emphasize developments that are highly promising. The first is 
the development and application of Dynamic Linear Models. These models offer many 
opportunities to account for dynamics in competitive response. Recent developments in 
new empirical industrial organization models, including structural modeling, also offer 
new avenues for future developments.
The models I present in this survey have been applied in a wide array of areas, but in other 
areas they have barely been used at all, nor will they be. This inapplicability is because the 
data they require are not available in areas such as business-to-business markets or services 
(e.g., banking, insurance, industrial), which have intensive competitive battles that the 
traditional scanner data-based models that I present here do not model. Furthermore, 
most models consider price-, non-price, and advertising competition, but competition 
through and between retailers has not been fully exploited.
In this survey I also illustrate how an evolutionary model-building process may proceed 
in the science of marketing. The idea of evolutionary model building can be applied to 
make explicit relations between different kinds of models and to specify future directions 
of research. Models evolve for many reasons, including the availability of new specifica-
tions, new estimation methods, access to better data, the identification of opportunities 
to improve the specification, and new ideas to combine different research streams. The 
area of competitive response models still offers many opportunities for development along 
these lines.
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